

*Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity* [Oxford University Press, 2002]). Although twentieth-century Christian missions were sustained by resources and scholarship from the global North, as Longkumer indicates in her chapter, by the 1970s, Christianity began to 'seek organizational forms which realized indigenous flows from the grass roots' (p. 448). Rather than portending a continuous link with the makeup of European state traditions, such as the nonconforming Methodist movement's perpetuation of Anglican episcopal polity, these 'indigenous flows' developed in reaction to (even as a rupture with) dominant, especially Roman Catholic, traditions.

This work will appeal to a broad base of scholars. The theme of dissent in shifting contexts will resonate with readers interested in Christian history and theology, and modern religion, more generally. Readers fascinated by the wide spectrum of contemporary Christianity – from the historic state traditions to emerging neo-pentecostal and indigenous churches – will value the balanced, encyclopedic approach of this volume.

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**The Invention of Jewish Theocracy: The Struggle for Legal Authority in Modern Israel**, Alexander Kaye, Oxford University Press, 2020 (ISBN 978-0-1909-2274-0), x + 264 pp., hb £28.99

As the possibility of establishing a Jewish State in Mandate Palestine became more real, the rebirth of the ancient culture of the Jews became more real. The revival of the Hebrew language, the ingathering of the Jewish people after thousands of years of exile, the resettlement of the traditional homeland, and the re-establishment of a Jewish state – all were dreams about to be fulfilled. What, then, about the re-establishment of Jewish national law? What would be the proper relationship between the legal system of a modern, democratic state and the received institutions and body of Jewish law? Could a modern constitutional state and traditional Jewish law (*halakha*) be merged into one Jewish national legal system?

This question was posed and resolved for the first time between the years 1935 and 1950 for the State of Israel. It is also, however, a burning question in the world of Islam as Muslims consider how Islamic law (*shari'a*) and the modern state might be fused into one Muslim national legal system. The Jewish struggle is an interesting case study.

In this very fine book, Alexander Kaye points to the dichotomy between 'legal pluralism' and 'legal centralism'. In cultures whose legal system is pluralistic, many types of law exist side by side within the general state law. Thus, in pre-modern Europe, the feudal lord, the city authorities, the Church, parental authority, and so on – all existed side by side, with the occasional clash being resolved by the highest authority. *Halakha* was also a pluralistic system with rabbinic courts that were independent of one another scattered through all Jewish communities and competing codes of Jewish law. The Persians, the Ottomans, and the British also governed their empires by allowing a plurality of legal systems to exist within a loose larger framework.

The modern state, by contrast, centers political and legal power in itself. There is a constitution and all law must fall within its purview. There is one law for the land and everyone must follow the law. The authority of the law rests with the king or with the people, not with God and the clergy. Could *halakha* which is legally pluralistic be merged with state law which is legally centralistic? This was the question. Kaye carefully traces the problems and the answers to this question.

On the one hand, there were serious difficulties in creating an integrated centralized legal system: (1) *Halakha* has requirements that are not workable in the law of a modern secular state: It does not generally permit women and non-Jews to serve as witnesses or as judges. It has rules for the prosecution of capital crimes and certain civil cases that are not compatible with modern law. And *halakha* might require the enforcement of ritual law by the state. (2) *Halakha* has always been pluralistic. There had always been 'the law of the Jewish king', 'the law of the non-Jewish authorities under which Jews lived', 'the law of non-rabbinic authorities within the Jewish community', and so on within which *halakha* worked. (3) There was no consensus among modern *halakhic* authorities on whether to, or how to, modify the *halakha* to make it applicable in a centralist modern state, including those who objected to the idea of a Torah/constitution in principle because such a state should await the coming of the messiah. And (4) separating *halakha* from the modern state would insulate the *halakha* from having to confront modern claims such as the rights of women, homosexuals, non-Jews, and so forth. Many regarded this as an advantage.

On the other hand, there was the dream of realizing the full rebirth of Jewish tradition, including its legal system. The centralized solution would recognize the Torah as the constitution of the new state or, at least, this solution would require a constitution that would recognize the Torah as the guiding law of the state. It would also create a centralized integrated court system and a centralized rabbinate. Prominent religious Zionist authorities, primary among them the first Chief Rabbi of Palestine and later Israel, Rabbi Isaac Herzog, Meir Bar Ilan, Zerah Wahrhaftig, and others wrote, talked, preached, and negotiated for the centralized

solution. Others worked on lesser compromises such as the incorporation of Jewish ('Hebrew') law into state law.

By the 1950s, the battle was over. Those in favor of Torah and *halakha* as the law of the land (and most of the lesser suggestions) had lost for two reasons: (1) The overwhelming number of persons involved in forming the legal structures of the State of Israel was not at all religious. The religious Zionists were simply outvoted. (2) There was not enough consensus among the religious Zionists on how to modify the *halakha* to make it compatible with modern, democratic values. Religious Zionists moved to a position of 'pragmatic pluralism and principled centralism' with parallel court systems, centralized rabbinic control over rabbis and over personal status law, and submission to the authority of the state Supreme Court (pp. 125 ff.).

The forcible removal of already-established Jewish settlements from Sinai, Gaza, and the West Bank in response to various peace initiatives led many religious Zionists to believe that the State had abandoned the mission of settlement of the land. This group no longer trusted the State of Israel to fulfill the religious dream. Religious Zionists have challenged, and even defied, the government. They have become very active in the military, in politics, and in education. They have also rejected pragmatic legal pluralism in favor of a more militant assertion of the priority of *halakha*. There were even excesses such as the unheard-of assassination of the (secular) Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, by a religious Zionist. In addition, the secularist groups have responded with increasingly militant views. Kaye describes this well (pp. 161–7) though, unfortunately, he omits mention of the general trend to renewed fundamentalism in contemporary worldwide culture as the broader context. The conflict over the relationship between *halakha* and the secular state has, thus, reappeared. Even religious Zionist moderates are calling for a truly pluralist, parallel system of courts in which rabbinic courts would handle not only personal status issues but also civil issues, and all individuals would be allowed the choice of rabbinic or secular courts, with all decisions being equally binding (pp. 167–70).

The issue of the relationship of law to religion in the context of religious law inside a democratic state is, thus, very much alive – in Jewish as well as Islamic, Hindu, and other contexts (for a legal analysis of this question, see Michael J. Broyde, *Sharia Tribunals, Rabbinic Courts, and Christian Panels: Religious Arbitration in America and the West* [Oxford University Press: 2017]). Kaye's book is a fine contribution to this vital discussion.

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